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Disability, Unemployment, Immigration: Does Solidarity Matter
in Times of Crisis in France?
Manlio Cinalli and Carlo De Nuzzo
Introduction
This chapter focuses on three particular fields of socio-economic disad-
vantage, namely, disability, unemployment, and immigration, with the aim
of assessing the concrete applications of solidarity, and their potential
cross-field variations. In these three fields, policies are expected to have
been shaped by the traditional French welfare agenda to allow the best
combination of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Equality’, through the working of the prin-
ciple of solidarity itself. Solidarity has historically emerged as a concrete
operationalisation of the third Revolutionary pillar of French Republican-
ism, namely, Fraternity. Right at the beginning of its Revolutionary roots,
Fraternity referred especially to national identity and the cohesion of
French people against foreign anti-revolutionary forces. Yet it later stood
out as the crucial principle to avoid a potential short-circuit between Free-
dom and Equality (Spitz 2005). These latter could hardly be under a worse
threat than the constitution of “groups” of low freedom and equality;
hence, solidarity came to guarantee various forms of redistribution in
favour of certain “groups” suffering from long-term social and economic
disadvantage. The first determined intervention of Republican institutions
through top-down organised social action can be traced as far back as in
the 19th century, as soon as industrialisation and the liberal market pro-
duced the worst miseries, and their ‘miserables’ (Hugo 1849, 1862): this
was the time, for example, when government established some minimal
protection of children in the labour market in terms of minimum age,
working times, and school attendance.
The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to see whether solidarity as a
well-functional structure to fill in the gap between freedom and individual
equality, can still be taken today as a powerful and viable tool to readdress
the potential marginalisation of most disadvantaged groups such as the
disabled, the unemployed, and immigrants. Indeed, throughout the 2000s
and the 2010s, an overall process of retrenchment has affected all the main
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branches of French welfare, with family benefits representing the only ex-
ception. The substantial stability of policies concerning the family shows
the importance given to family-related solidarity in the political agenda, as
well as the key role played by the state services devoted to the family, in-
cluding the large network of CAFs, (Caisse d’allocations familiales) that
manage welfare state provisions. In a sense, family under the Republican
framework is still seen as a nucleus of ‘marital bond of solidarity’ that de-
serves to be protected. Suffice it to say, family services manage the provi-
sion of the RMI, (Revenu minimum d’insertion, Minimum Income Bene-
fit) for more than one million households, while public expenditure on the
family is substantially higher than the EU-27 average (Eurostat 2010)
even without taking into account the fiscal support also available to fami-
lies. However, we will also see that, behind a general commitment to the
family, welfare retrenchment has also regarded family policies. This is ev-
ident only when studying more closely specific fields of marginalisation.1
The potential role of solidarityfor contemporary France is evident when
considering the social, political, and economic burden of this country.
France’s economy is the fifth largest in the world (or the 9th largest econo-
my by purchasing power parity) and represents around one fifth of the
GDP in the Euro zone. France maintains today a leading role in European
politics and economics in spite of the recent economic crisis, which was
the deepest since the Great Depression of 1929. Findings in Table 1 put
the French case in a mid-term perspective over the last five years. The
largest sector in the economy is services (e.g. banking, energy, tourism,
transport and health) providing 78.9 % of the GDP; the manufacturing sec-
tor accounts for 19.3% and agriculture for less than 2%. In manufacturing,
France is one of the global leaders in the automotive, aerospace and rail-
way sectors as well as in cosmetics and luxury goods. Furthermore, France
has a highly educated labour force and the highest number of science
graduates per thousand workers in Europe. International trade is strong,
France being the sixth-largest exporter and the fourth-largest importer of
manufactured goods. The specific composition of the French economy is a
combination of an extensive private sector with strong government inter-
vention. Having a large population in public employment, France also has
natural protection from sudden job losses. Yet, the drawback of this
1 Cf. the restrictive reforms to (un)validate family solidarity in the section dedicated
to immigration
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French mixed economy is a chronic public deficit, responsible for high
public debt (67.5% of the GDP in 2008) and unbalanced social costs (part
of government spending is for supporting healthcare, pension and unem-
ployment).
The strong public intervention in welfare, however, provides hardly suf-
ficient recovery for vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, im-
migrants, and the unemployed. Starting with unemployment, emphasis
should be put on its consistently high rates through time. In fact, France’s
unemployment rate fell below 10% for the first time in 2012. Yet unem-
ployment has since then declined more slowly than in other leading Euro-
pean economies, as a gradual recovery in economic growth and job cre-
ation has been offset by the high number of young people entering the
labour force every year. Thus, although unemployment has been decreas-
ing in all age categories, particularly among younger people, rates of
youth unemployment are still significant today, with approximately a quar-
ter of young people unemployed. The government has increasingly weak-
ened its commitment to unemployment benefits, although these latter re-
main relatively high for European standards (up to 75% of previous salary
for the first year).
As regards refugees, and immigrants more generally, there has been a
similar worsening of policy protection (further reinforced with the econo-
mic crisis between the late 2000s and the early 2010s). The traditional
generosity of the French system, both in terms of welcoming the displaced
in the short term, and integrating them as full citizens in the long term, has
been replaced by a series of restrictive twists. Accordingly, new ‘reforms’
have prevented immigrants from accessing the country by making it more
difficult for them to attain citizenship (Cinalli 2017), while at the same
time nurturing anti-immigrant discourses which push the idea that immi-
grants are a burden on society (immigration subie). Perhaps the strongest
symbol of the immigration crisis has been the 'Calais Jungle', a camp near
the Northern city of Calais. Many immigrants living in this camp have
pursued the objective of crossing the Channel and entering Britain. The
camp gained global attention during the European refugee and migrant cri-
sis, particularly with respect to mass evictions which French authorities
have been carrying out since October 2016 (Baumard 2016).
Lastly, there has also been a worsening of policy protection for sick
people and the disabled, particularly when considering the policies of pub-
lic expenditure rationalisation and the reduction in all spheres of govern-
ment. While public authorities control a generous healthcare system, they
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
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dedicate only 1.8% of the GDP to disability policy (figure for 2014). Suf-
fice it to say that the disability aid has met with regular cuts amid outcries
from French disability groups; and that the FNATH (Fédération Nationale
des Accidentés du Travail et des Handicapés) has stated that “choosing the
most fragile and excluded people in society for budget cuts is unaccept-
able”.2 In addition, the two million people with disabilities in France are
the first victims of unemployment: their unemployment rate at 21% shows
a level that is more than double the percentage of people of the same
working age (Dares 2016). To this, one needs to add that people with dis-
abilities are also older and less educated than the average French popula-
tion.
Table 1: General economic statistics, France 2012-2016 (Source: OECD
data)
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Population (million) 63.4 63.7 64.0 64.3 64.5 
GDP per capita (EUR) 32,9
29
33,2
21
33,4
69
33,9
34
34,43
3
GDP (EUR bn) 2,08
7
2,11
6
2,14
1
2,18
1
2,222
Economic Growth (GDP, annual
variation in %)
0.2 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.5 
Domestic Demand (annual variation
in %)
0.4 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.4
Consumption (annual variation in %) -0.2 0.6 0.7 1.5 -
Investment (annual variation in %) 0.4 -0.7 -0.4 0.9 -
Exports (G&S, annual variation in
%)
2.7 1.9 3.4 6.0 -
Imports (G&S, annual variation in
%)
0.8 2.2 4.8 6.4 -
Industrial Production (annual varia-
tion in %)
-2.2 -0.5 -0.9 1.8 -
Retail Sales (annual variation in %) 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.8 -
2 http://www.connexionfrance.com/social-benefits-student-housing-disability home-
help-cut-income-support-rsa-11820-view-article.html.
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 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Unemployment Rate 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.0
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -4.8 -4.0 -4.0 -3.5 -
Public Debt (% of GDP) 89.5 92.3 95.3 96.2 -
Inflation Rate (HICP, annual varia-
tion in %, eop)
1.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 -
Inflation Rate (HICP, annual varia-
tion in %)
2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 -
Inflation (PPI, annual variation in %) 2.8 0.3 -1.4 -2.2 -
Policy Interest Rate (%) 0.75 0.25 0.05 0.05 -
Stock Market (annual variation in %) 15.2 18.0 -0.5 8.5 -
Exchange Rate (vs USD) 1.32 1.38 1.21 1.09 -
Exchange Rate (vs USD, aop) 1.29 1.33 1.33 1.11 -
Current Account (% of GDP) -2.1 -1.3 -0.7 - -
Current Account Balance (EUR bn) -44.0 -28.0 -23.0 -4.0 -
Trade Balance (EUR billion) -70.6 -62.3 -58.0 -44.8 -
Disability
There are five million disabled people living in France, two million of
whom are less mobile. Thirty percent of motor disabilities are caused by
accidents. Some 135,000 disabled children attend ordinary schools and
110,000 are registered at specialised institutions. Disability spending in-
creased by 13.5 billion euros from 2005 to 2014 (DRESS 2017). The ef-
fort has amounted to € 46.6 billion in 2014, or 2.2% of the gross domestic
product (GDP). This effort relies first and foremost on the social protec-
tion system. The tax and social benefits in addition amounted to € 3.4 bil-
lion in 2014. The overall budget for the mission "solidarité, insertion et
égalité des chances" amounted to 18 billion euros for 2016, showing gov-
ernmental commitment to disability.3 From a legal viewpoint, the Act No.
2005-102 of 11 February 2005 on ‘equal rights and opportunities, partici-
3 https://informations.handicap.fr/decret-loi-fevrier-2005.php.
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
279
This content downloaded from 159.149.192.92 on Tue, 12 Mar 2019 07:54:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
pation and citizenship of people with disabilities’ 4 amended the 1975 acts
on the disabled (Act No. 75-534 of 30 June 1975) and social and medical
institutions (Act No. 75-535 of 30 June 1975). In particular, the new law
strengthened some existing measures, but it also introduced new ones
based on the principle of national equality and solidarity
Prior to the latest reforms, the disabled were looked after as a part of a
to-be-protected “group”. The developments in legislation and consequent
policies have meant that today, the disabled are active subjects of their
own lives, and responsible citizens who have an equal place in society.
Thus, the disabled people, just like any other group at risk of socio-econo-
mic disadvantage, have been put back at the core of traditional French
concern to strike the balance between the two fundamental pillars of free-
dom and individual equality. The principle of full “individual” equality is
at the heart of the welfare state’s mission; most crucially, it is supposed to
be achieved through various forms of redistribution in solidarity with cer-
tain “groups” suffering from long-term social and economic disadvantage.
This process is also grounded on the strict duty of each individual towards
the community, or social solidarity. It is indeed this commitment that guar-
antees the Republican affiliation of citizens and their unity as a sustainable
national body, not only vis-à-vis other national communities beyond
French borders (Fraternity in the main meaning of Revolution), but also
vis-à-vis the worst outcomes of individualism and liberal markets for in-
ternal social cohesion. The priority that France puts on top-down state
agency completes the specific French approach to welfare: that is to say,
solidarity is implemented as social action organised by the state. Accord-
ingly, disability is for us a first crucial field of solidarity to retrace the idea
that the state is indeed at the service of society.
Labour Market Access for Disabled Workers
The 2005 Act is the most important legislation regarding measures to sup-
port disabled workers in France. In line with the 1987 Disability Employ-
ment Act,5 the law has introduced the employment of disabled persons to
4 Loi numero 2005-102 du 11 février 2005 pour l'égalité des droits et des chances, la
participation et la citoyenneté des personnes handicapées.
5 Loi numero 87-517 du 10 juillet 1987 en faveur de l'emploi des travailleurs handi-
capés.
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the field of contractual policy, and finally, it has extended this legal obli-
gation to the whole world of work, public and private sectors combined
(Blanc and Stiker 1998, 56). The law thus represents a major step forward
in the recognition of disabled workers, and more generally it stands for the
virtues unanimously recognized and defended by the Republic such as the
principle of equality. The idea of solidarity is strong: workers with disabil-
ities are entitled to adjustments and arrangements in their working hours
and shifts. They also receive priority access to further training and contin-
uing education as part of their current position. In case of redundancy, the
notice period concerning a disabled worker is double that which is other-
wise used in the company. Disabled workers are also entitled to early re-
tirement from the age of 55 on the basis of 30 working years with disabled
worker status.
The 2005 law has also asserted once and for all the responsibility of
employers (Bardoulet and Igounet 2007). This follows previous legal acts,
in 1987 and in 1999 respectively, by which firms had to employ people
with disabilities, or otherwise pay penalties in cases of non-compliance.6
In particular, private companies and public employers with more than 20
employees have today the obligation to employ 6% of disabled people,
subject to paying a financial contribution. This system of quotas was dic-
tated by practical considerations, since employers do not naturally tend to
hire workers with disabilities. Without this policy, people with disabilities
would not be competitive: ‘les personnes handicapées ne sont pas capa-
bles d’entrer en compétition pour un emploi sur un pied d’égalité avec les
personnes valides et de l’emporter sur la base de leurs seuls mérites’’.7 In
the absence of direct recruitment, however, the company can sign a plan
with the unions or use subcontractors who employ persons with disabili-
ties. This form of indirect recruitment is considered to be enough to fulfil
solidarity with the disabled, and hence, avoid the payment of penalties.
6 Conseil de l’Europe, Groupe de travail sur l'évaluation des critères individuels
régissant l'octroi d'allocations et d'aides personnelles aux personnes handicapées
Evaluation du handicap en Europe – similitudes et differences: rapport, 2002,
p.128. The French law of 1987 introduced the hiring of workers with disabilities in-
to contract law, extending the legal obligation to hire workers with disabilities in
both the public and the private sectors (Blanc and Stiker 1998).
7 Interview realised on the 8th July 2016. ‘It is impossible for disabled workersto
compete on an equal footing with able-bodied people and to succeed on the sole ba-
sis of their personal merit’.
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
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Employers also have another third option. They can pay a contribution
fee to the ‘fund for the professional inclusion of disabled people’ (associa-
tion de gestion du fonds pour l'insertion professionnelle des personnes
handicapées), an organisation which is dedicated to furthering profession-
al inclusion in the private sector. Unfortunately, recourse to this third op-
tion has largely been abused by employers, who have transformed it into a
devious practice for avoiding direct or indirect recruitment as in the other
two options (Coulibaly and Fardeau 2004, 25). Thus, in spite of significant
progress on the legislative front, some employers still consider workers
with disabilities as fundamentally unfit to operate in a professional envi-
ronment. François Bloch-Laine aptly summarises this attitude in his analy-
sis of the issues associated with integrating people with disabilities: “Il
paraît anormal d’embaucher des handicapés dans des entreprises ordi-
naires alorsqu’il y a tant de demandeurs d’emploi parmi les personnes
valides”. Large companies are aware of their legal obligations, but they
usually prefer to pay penalties rather than hire workers with disabilities. In
the private sector, more than 60% of employers adopt this strategy to
avoid direct solidarity with the disabled.
At the same time, the 2005 law has matched an increasing recognition
and attention paid to persons with disabilities in terms of public policies.
The creation of Departmental Houses for Persons with Disabilities
(MDPH is worth reiterating here. Their mission is to welcome, inform,
support and advise persons with disabilities, and their families. Moreover,
beyond the purely medical approach, accessibility and the right to com-
pensation have become essential pillars of policies for people with disabil-
ities. Hence, the objective of the 2005 Act has been to promote the partici-
pation of people with disabilities in all spheres of economic and social life.
A number of tools to promote vocational training and the integration of
people with disabilities have been strengthened, notably through the cre-
ation of the ‘Fund for the Integration of People with Disabilities in the
Public Service’. The main obstacle in this case is the lack of workers with
disabilities with the right professional and educational qualifications,
which also explains why some employers prefer to pay penalties instead of
hiring such workers. The main way to stimulate the effective participation
of people with disabilities in working life is by promoting better access to
transport, schools and businesses. The main aim is to open up society and
shrink the possibilities for exclusion and stigmatisation.
Manlio Cinalli and Carlo De Nuzzo
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Education Access for Disabled Pupils
Education represents a necessary precondition for workers with disabili-
ties to enjoy equal opportunities and equal treatment on the labour market.
Hence, the Act of 11 February 2005 has put some crucial emphasis on the
right for any children with a disability to attend their local primary and
secondary schools.8 The right to schooling is part of the personalised edu-
cation plan which ensures that the necessary adjustments are made to the
school infrastructure and to timetables to allow alternate attendance at a
specialised institution if required. Among the main issues there is the fact
that the two million disabled people in France are older and less educated
than the average French population. In fact, 90% of jobseekers with dis-
abilities have a degree that is equal or inferior to a CAP (Bardoulet and
Igounet 2007, 81). This low level of qualification can be explained by the
many obstacles encountered by pupils with disabilities in the course of
their schooling, which often translates into the fact that disabled pupils
make common recourse to special schools and medical institutions. The
2005 law seems to give some primary attention to this when stating that
"le service public de l’éducation assure une formation scolaire profession-
nelle et supérieure aux enfants, aux adolescents et aux adultes présentant
un handicap ou un trouble de santé invalidant". Hence, this law reasserts
the right of people with disabilities to receive an education in an institu-
tion located as close as possible to their dwellings.
The law posits the principle that personalised solutions should be de-
veloped on a case-by-case basis. It appeals to the principle of non-discrim-
ination, by arguing that disabilities should not be turned into insuperable
obstacles because of some environments that do not meet accessibility
standards. In simpler words, the legislator seems to be aware that, even if
the right of children with disabilities to attend an ordinary school has been
recognised, the availability of specialised teaching staff and the issue of
accessibility are still huge problems that need solutions. Suffice it to say
that many school buildings are still not accessible for children with severe
disabilities. This is the first obstacle that has to be removed in order to in-
tegrate children with disabilities, together with the need to increase the
8 This is in line with the Act No. 75-534 of 30 June 1975 made education, training
and career guidance for disabled children and adults a national obligation. Cf. also
the circular of January 1982 that reaffirmed the principle that adolescents with dis-
abilities were, as far as possible, to benefit from ordinary schooling.
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
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number of specialised teachers and specialised training for teachers in
general. Following the limited recruitment of teaching assistants with a
dedicated training, France is still struggling to meet the needs of the ca.
80,000 children with disabilities attending its public schools. This goes
clearly against the ambition to increase the number of children with dis-
abilities in the education system (Vuibert 2007).
Disability Guidelines Laid Out in the ‘Loi Travail’
The Loi Travail covers the whole labour market, ruling in particular the
intricacies of its operations. In so doing, it has also developed a number of
specific measures concerning disability. These measures are part of a
broader concern with people for whom an incapacity occurs, and with
caregivers of disabled children or dependent persons. The fact that the law
is also designed to support caregivers follows the fact that some disabili-
ties require constant assistance from family members or close friends. In
particular, the provisions of the Loi Travail have established that:
• The remit of Cap Emploi, the employment agency working with peo-
ple with disabilities, is extended to include work retention. The aim is
to offer targeted, long-term help for people with disabilities by promot-
ing integration and a greater continuity in the provision of services
from looking for employment to overcoming obstacles in the work-
place.
• From the moment they are hired, workers recognised as having disabil-
ities will be referred to the company’s occupational physician so they
can benefit from a close and personalised follow-up, starting with the
first information and accident prevention visit.
• Each company’s CHSCT (Comitéd’hygiène, de sécurité et des condi-
tions de travail, that is, the Committee for workplace hygiene, security
and working conditions) is entrusted with additional responsibilities to
better care for workers with disabilities.
• A system of employment support for workers with disabilities has been
introduced. This support includes a series of socio-medical follow-ups
and help to promote professional integration, in order to enable work-
ers with disabilities to gain and maintain employment. Its implementa-
tion also includes specific support and guidance from employers.
Manlio Cinalli and Carlo De Nuzzo
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As regards families specifically:
- If a disabled child or adult is present in the home, a derogation from
the prohibition to take more than 24 working days of paid vacation in a
row will be put in place.
- In the criteria for departures on leave, the presence of a disabled child
or adult within the families of employees will be taken into account. As
far as caregivers are concerned, if they care for a child or an adult with a
disability, then they are exempt from the general rule that prohibits work-
ers from taking more than 24 consecutive working days of paid vacation.
If an employee cares for a disabled child or adult, this is also taken into
account in the case of a dismissal.
Unemployment
French policy reforms throughout the 2000s have also had an important
influence on the situation of the unemployed. Once again, it is interesting
to assess the extent to which policies have remained faithful to the tradi-
tional agenda governing French welfare from the point of view ofstriking
the right balance between freedom and (individual) equality. As said, a
state-driven social action has been a long-term characteristic of the French
Republican system, which can be retraced as far back as in the 19th centu-
ry, when the state emerged as the source of “public service” through its
own institutions and decision-making (Duguit 1913, 15). Since then, natu-
rally, many developments have taken place, especially with the strengthen-
ing of a fully-fledged welfare state in the aftermath of WWII, which has
combined elements from the Beveridgean and Bismarckian models (Esp-
ing-Andersen 1990). Yet, if we focus more specifically on unemployment
protection, we notice that it has changed considerably in France over the
course of the 2000s, in line with the overall retrenchment of the welfare
state.
Not only were benefits quite radically restructured, but there was also a
significant shift with respect to the instruments used for unemployment
protection, with an increasing emphasis being laid on “active” measures
for labour market integration compared to the “passive” provision of in-
come maintenance. While French unemployment benefits have remained
relatively generous, and while there has been substantial stability in terms
of the investments made for every percentage point of unemployment, the
target group of benefit-based efforts has been progressively reduced, with
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
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a decreasing proportion of the unemployed population benefitting from
this type of protection.
These changes in the unemployment field date back to the end of the
Trente Glorieuses in the mid-1970s. Indeed, the necessary self-financing
aspects of the previously generous system became less and less viable as
unemployment started to dramatically rise. Faced with the growing reti-
cence of employers to accept further increases in contribution rates, social
partners increasingly latched on to the idea of asking the state for fiscal
help in order to keep the system afloat. On the one hand, social partners
increasingly accused the government of failing to properly scale up its par-
ticipation in a context of rapidly increasing unemployment. On the other
hand, the government increasingly objected to the fact that it could con-
tribute any more to a system over which it exercised so little control. Most
crucially, the idea of solidarity as a one-way right to be helped that is giv-
en to the needy started to weaken in an era when neo-monetarism replaced
Keynesian policies in major world economies, progressively introducing
an idea of solidarity that was more in line with growing neo-liberal ideolo-
gy in general. The final development was soon to be bring about a new
approach to welfare rights, whereby solidarity was rather a two-way pro-
cess involving some strong responsibilities on the side of welfare recipi-
ents. While the finalisation of this process came about only in the 1990s
with the establishment of rights and responsibilities (Giddens 1998), the
1980s provided a decade of economic innovation calling for the imminent
adaptation of ideas.
In fact, the provision of new resources under the Mitterrand presidency
was interpreted by many social partners, and by the unions in particular, as
an attempt on the part of the government to gain more managerial lever-
age. In 1982, employers announced that they would not accept any further
increase in their contribution rate, suspending their cooperation with the
unemployment insurance system. The CNPF (Conseil National du Pa-
tronat Français, the National Council of French Employers now known as
the MEDEF, Mouvement des Entreprises de France, the Movement of
French Enterprises) suggested that the system needed to be reformed by
introducing a distinction between insurance expenditures (régime d’assur-
ance) available to employees having worked and contributed to the system
for a long time, and the solidarity expenditures (régime de solidarité)
available to other job seekers who could not rely on the insurance regime
to intervene on their behalf. The régime d’assurance had to remain under
the control of social partners, while the régime de solidarité would fall un-
Manlio Cinalli and Carlo De Nuzzo
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der the full control of the state. It was at this stage that this new division of
costs and responsibilities between the social partners and the state was in-
troduced, transforming the unemployment protection system into what it
looks like today.
Since the more generous benefits of the régime d’assurance were only
accessible to those having contributed for a long time, this change repre-
sented the first important restriction affecting the unemployed. In addition,
benefits were also restructured, with the introduction of a “single decreas-
ing benefit” (allocation unique dégressive), which declined, by a certain
percentage over time, and at a faster rate for younger beneficiaries. There
was also a drastic reduction in the maximum period of compensation for
those with short contribution histories, while eligibility requirements were
tightened for different types of compensation, and especially for minimum
benefits. These measures, which were increasingly framed throughout the
1990s as a form of ‘activation’, made it progressively difficult for unem-
ployed people to access the main tier of unemployment protection under
the régime d’assurance. In a context of rising unemployment, these inter-
ventions led to a steep decrease in the rate of unemployed people benefit-
ting from unemployment insurance, and in the increasing ‘eviction’ from
the system of those with limited contribution histories.
Throughout the 2000s and the 2010s, reforms of the unemployment
system have been complemented by a number of insertion programmes
meant to increase “activation”, in line with a more explicit idea of solidari-
ty as something that needs to be deserved as well as requiring a number of
obligations on the side of recipients of solidarity.9 The introduction of spe-
cial subsidised contracts (contrats aidés), an important aspect of French
employment policy, was extended to the private sector. Many of these spe-
cial contracts, both in the private and the public sectors, have included
provisions that circumvent labour laws and the collective agreements gov-
erning normal employment, with an extensive reliance on “atypical” con-
tracts based on short-term and part-time arrangements. The “active turn”
of recent years has not suppressed a number of specificities of the French
labour market, in which jobs and skills are typically highly firm-specific,
and in which the initial entrance into the workforce is rarely easy or
9 It should be noted that some Keynesian logic was still alive in the 1990s as a result
of the political force of the left in France. For example, in 1997, the NSEJ program
(Nouveaux Services- Emploi Jeunes) offered contracts of five years in the public
and voluntary sectors to ca. 350,000 young people with low qualifications.
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straightforward. It is not uncommon for young people to move from one
short-term, entry-level position to another until they finally manage to se-
cure a permanent job or fall back into unemployment. Overall then, one
notes that in spite of a few remnants from France’s earlier Keynesian ap-
proach, the interventions in French unemployment policy have sought to
emphasise ‘activation’ elements, in accordance with the broader supply-
focused trend characterising European unemployment policies throughout
the 2000s and the 2010s.
Meanwhile, the conditions governing insurance compensation have be-
come more restrictive. Today, the substitute income known as the ARE
(allocation d'aide au retour à l'emploi, the return-to-work allowance) is
granted to the unemployed on the basis of their age and how long they
have been affiliated. These types of benefits are only paid to workers who
lose their job in certain specific conditions. For instance, they need to have
worked for at least six out of the previous 22 months. Another crucial con-
dition is that such benefits can only be granted in cases of involuntary un-
employment; only in some very limited cases are resignations considered
to be legitimate and thereby entitle workers to benefits. It is also necessary
to register (that is, the unemployed have to officially declare themselves to
be job-seekers), which makes it easier for the employment agency to as-
sess whether they are “actively seeking employment”. The level of cover-
age nevertheless remains quite generous, since for a person earning the
minimum wage, the ARE it corresponds to is up to three quarters of their
lost earnings. The use of sanctions has increased in recent years, particu-
larly following the 2008 law that introduced more frequent controls and
more severe sanctions for those rejecting job offers. In spite of this, the
amount of people benefitting from unemployment insurance remains sig-
nificant, as can be deduced from the ca. 25,000 people removed from the
register every year, out of an overall insured population of two and a half
million people.
For a long time, the UNEDIC10 has been in charge of the entire system
of unemployment insurance, while the CGT (Confédération générale du
travail, General Confederation of Labour) has relied on its own unem-
ployment committee. Unions have significant powers when it comes to fi-
nalising collective contracts, establishing subsidiary branches within com-
10 According to the Unedic report (Les Echos, 26 January 2007), 24 800 sanctions
have been established in 2006.
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panies, and, to some extent, influencing life within these companies (for
instance during elections for employee representatives). In membership
terms, the French trade union movement is one of the weakest in Europe,
since no more than 11% of employees are unionised and since the move-
ment is divided into rival confederations competing for leadership and
membership. Nevertheless, trade unions enjoy strong public opinion sup-
port and are able to significantly mobilise French workers, which means
that they sometimes have a decisive impact on government policy (for ex-
ample, in 2006 they pressured the government into withdrawing a new
type of employment contract for young workers). Attention can also be fo-
cused on the provisions targeting the unemployed, especially the young,
within the broader framework of the national education system. In particu-
lar, it has repeatedly been pointed out that too many young people are
channelled into general education, when the labour market (at least in
some areas), is in need of highly specialised workers. So a greater empha-
sis has therefore been placed on the students’ need to receive specialised
training, to prepare them for entering work sectors with better employment
opportunities.
As a consequence, throughout the 2000s one notes a growing profes-
sionalisation of diplomas, and the introduction of new professional curric-
ula leading to various masters and certificates. In addition, more resources
have been devoted to apprenticeship programmes, in order to improve the
articulation between the training and production systems, for instance by
introducing professional development training and support for courses al-
ternating formal education with work placements. Measures designed to
promote a large variety of different training programmes have thus been at
the heart of the government policies designed to tackle youth unemploy-
ment. “Learning and certification contracts” (contrats d’apprentissage et
de qualification) have indeed proved to be quite effective, with a number
of studies confirming that they increase trainees’ chances of successfully
entering the labour market compared to students from vocational schools
such as the lycées professionnels. Similar conclusions have been drawn
about the “certification contracts” (contrats de qualification), which also
increase its beneficiaries’ chances to quickly find employment that is both
stable and not subsidised by the state.
Lastly, some emphasis needs to be put on the jurisprudence and the rel-
evant role of the courts in the field. Looking at the most recent develop-
ments, an eventful case consisted of the demand by the Haut-Rhin County
Council to recipients of the ‘solidarity labour income’ (Revenu de solidar-
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ité active) to carry out seven hours of weekly ‘solidarity’ work for asso-
ciations, local authorities, retirement homes or public institutions starting
from January 2017. This highly controversial request was successively
considered to be unlawful by the Strasbourg Administrative Court (juge-
ment n° 1304888, 29 octobre 2015). But the motivation referred simply to
the fact the Haut-Rhin County Council was not the competent authority
for paying the ‘solidarity labour income’. As a consequence, this motiva-
tion has safeguarded the principle of conditional solidarity even if this is
linked to the willingness of parties involved, including recipients (“la situ-
ation particulière de l'intéressé”).11 In fact, one may argue that the princi-
ple of conditionality has gone through a further twist in the request of in-
stitutional actors, reversing the obligation of solidarity on the shoulders of
solidarity recipients. In other words, solidarity is seen as an obligation that
exists on the shoulders of the needy, who must commit to giving back soli-
darity to reciprocate for the help which they receive. Under this under-
standing of solidarity, the contract is des ut do rather than do ut des. Only
more time will tell if this specific piece of jurisprudence will be essential
to delete once and for all the idea that solidarity is a one-way act of unre-
ciprocated generosity in favour of the opposing idea that looks at solidari-
ty as a two-way relationship that engages beneficiaries of help to provide
solidarity vis-à-vis the broader community that welfare providers repre-
sent.
The Loi Travail
The most recent key reform of the French labour market, the Loi Travail,12
was undertaken in the summer of 2016 – after strong opposition and sev-
eral struggles taking place across the political domain and civil society.
This law is a piece of national French legislation that relates to employme.
It is also known as the El Khomri law, since it was first presented to Par-
liament on 17 February 2016 by the labour minister Myriam El Khomri. It
was passed into law on 8 August 2016, and came into force on 1 January
2017, following huge waves of protest throughout 2016. While the legal
11 http://www.lefigaro.fr/social/2016/10/05/20011-20161005ARTFIG00086-rsa-con-
tre-benevolat-pour-la-justice-le-dispositif-est-illegal.php.
12 Loi n° 2016-1088 of 8 August 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dia-
logue social et à la sécurisation des parcours professionnels.
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workweek is still 35 hours long, the law gives specific company agree-
ments precedence over branch agreements. The maximum number of
hours worked in a day (10 hours) can thus be extended to a full 12 hours,
in cases of increased activity or for reasons pertaining to the company’s
organisation. It is thus possible to raise the weekly number of hours
worked to 46 hours, instead of 44, over 12 weeks. Specific company
agreements can reduce the rate of overtime compensation from 25% to
10% of the base salary. However, company agreements must have been
ratified by the "majority" of workers (that is, signed by unions represent-
ing more than 50% of employees). In the absence of such a majority, mi-
nority trade unions (representing more than 30% of employees) can organ-
ise an internal referendum to validate the agreement.
Overall, it can be argued that the large space that the law gives to spell
out the conditions under which employers can use economic redundancy
(for example, operating losses for several months, deterioration in cash
flow, technological change, reorganisation for competitiveness, and refusal
of wage contract by employees), weakens any progressive and solidarity
element that may be singled out. Accordingly, the law allows companies
to adjust their organisation in order to "preserve or develop employment".
Majority agreements take precedence over employment contracts, includ-
ing when it comes to questions of remuneration and working hours. The
employees’ monthly salary cannot be reduced, but premiums can, for ex-
ample, be abolished. Employees who refuse to accept such agreements can
be dismissed for economic reasons. These employees then benefit from a
"personalised support programme", provided by Pôle Emploi and mainly
financed by the state. The criteria for economic redundancies are laid out
according to the size of the companies. Companies are allowed to lay off
workers in the event of a "significant reduction in orders or in turnover",
compared to the same period during the previous year.
Some emphasis, however, should be put on the promotion of gender
equality and the protection against overly strenuous work. The period dur-
ing which workers returning from their maternity leave cannot legally be
dismissed has been extended from four to ten weeks. In addition, for
young people who are neither in employment, enrolled in a course of stud-
ies or in training, the law extends a type of protection that is subject to re-
sources and that includes help to find employment and a monthly al-
lowance of 461 euros for one year. For those under the age of 28 and hav-
ing graduated less than three months earlier, a four-month job search assis-
tance programme has been put into place. It is also important to mention
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the 'garantie jeunes' aimed at better training for unemployed young peo-
ple. Most crucially, the Loi Travail establishes a day of solidarity that is to
say, the work of an additional day (seven hours) by the employees without
additional compensation. This is a controversial way of interpreting soli-
darity, since to many commentators it seems to flow especially from those
who can least afford it. The day of solidarity is fixed by a company or es-
tablishment agreement or, failing that, by branch agreement. In the ab-
sence of such agreements, the employer unilaterally fixes the day of soli-
darity after consulting the work’s council or, failing that, the PDs (Person-
nel Delegates).
Migration
Immigration offers the third field to evaluate the state of solidarity in con-
temporary France: this is indeed a very complex field characterised by in-
tense policy reforms over at least two decades. The French Office for Im-
migration and Integration (OFII), established in 2009, is today the State
operator responsible for the integration of newly-arrived migrants. It also
manages family and economic migration procedures, national reception of
asylum seekers, as well as assisted return and reintegration. The French
Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) han-
dles asylum cases. A number of organisations work as partners of public
authorities in handling reception and integration of legally staying foreign-
ers. Major legislative reforms have been implemented across the 2000s
and the 2010s including new tools for promoting access to citizenship, so-
cio-economic integration, and the fight against crime over migration.
These policies have thus far taken into account various economic, social
and cultural aspects, which have often forced different stakeholders to en-
gage with the concept of solidarity, both in terms of their first steps and
integration into the labour market, and willingness to make it easier for
them to walk along the pathway between immigration and citizenship.
Starting with the final step of immigrants’ access to citizenship, Repub-
lican France is renowned for its civic traditions, whereby group distinc-
tions in general are not made in the public space and play no hard role in
the distinction between citizens and non-citizens (Cinalli 2017). Yet, it is
interesting to see how French authorities, through their latest reforms,
have extended the notion of the public sphere to include more traditional
areas such as family. This is an important point for the argument of this
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chapter since family itself is supposed to be rooted in the most solidaristic
relationship that two individuals may reciprocally commit to. Accordingly,
legal reforms over acquisition of French citizenship through marriage rep-
resents a crucial indicator of the intrusion of the French state into the most
intimate site of solidarityindeed with the aim to evaluate and (in)validate
the intimate bond of marital solidarity. Provisions governing marriage
with a foreign spouse are obviously relevant for immigrants and citizens
with a migrant background since they are more likely to marry a foreigner
than the average French citizen.
A previous law from 1988 stated that citizenship could not be requested
until one year after the marriage. In 2003 and 2006, however, laws were
passed that further restricted access to citizenship through marriage, by
mandating that the spouse of a French citizen could only apply for citizen-
ship after two years of married life, a period which was then increased to
four years in 2006. This period of time has been extended to five years if
the foreign spouse has continuously resided in France for at least one year
following the wedding. In all these cases, it is easy to see how the authori-
ties have come to distrust marriage as a self-evident indicator of a truly
solidaritybond, but consider time to be the test of that bond’s sincerity. To
this cautious distrust, the French state has added more stringent conditions
to evaluate cultural proximity between the foreign spouse and the broader
national context, for example through the assessment, since 2003, of a
“sufficient mastery of the French language”. Applicants are also expected
to have a basic knowledge of France’s civic norms, including the “rights
and duties conferred by French citizenship”. And since 2006, the law has
put a minimal income requirement for sponsors to be considered eligible
for family reunification procedures. This required income is based on the
minimum wage (RMI), and must be earned through employment and in-
creases depending on the applicant’s number of children and/or family
members.13 Given that immigrants in France are more likely to be unem-
ployed or in more low-skilled work than nationals, this set of policies have
especially restricted the scope of redistributive and solidarity policies in
the migration field.
No doubt, this willingness to assess family life more closely is in line
with the political hegemony enjoyed by individualist policies and the neo-
13 Book 4, Title 1, Article R411-4 of the Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers
et du droit d'asile.
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liberal executive applying them throughout the 2000s (with the exception
of a short period of “cohabitation” at the very beginning of the decade).
This same hegemony has simultaneously accounted for more stringent
constraints in terms of socio-economic integration. In this case the major
emphasis must be put on the ‘contract of reception and integration’, to-
gether with its various employment-oriented initiatives. In principle, for-
eigners who wish to have paid employment have a number of commit-
ments to make, which translate in a number of clear administrative steps to
fulfil.14 Yet the contract pays little substantial attention to the specific con-
ditions of immigrants (and their descendants) in low income neighbour-
hoods, who must face various processes with difficulties and discrimina-
tion when trying to fulfil their promise of integration. The shortcomings in
terms of insufficient work-training, action plans, support of diversity-relat-
ed HR need, and counselling in situations of low self-confidence or limi-
ted information over the labour market add up to a very constraining con-
text for immigrants. Crucially, in this case, French authorities have trans-
ferred to NGOs and social firms the burden of sustaining immigrants
through granting specific funding.
Once again then, the notion of subsidiarity can be used to provide a cru-
cial framework so as to understand the developments of solidarity in
France. NGOs and social enterprises can thus implement programmes that
are broader in scope and deeper in outreach, targeting for example disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods with the highest percentages of immigrants (Es-
cafré-Dublet 2014). A number of organisations have thus taken the re-
sponsibility for actions that are invaluable to mediate between the ‘will-
ingness’ of the state to welcome on the one hand and, on the other, the
promise of immigrants to integrate. They may connect immigrants with
firms to create job opportunities, maintain databases of potential candi-
dates for employers, offer immigrants a course of preparation for a job
search, combine group workshops, individual coaching, media training
with professional communication and human resources. French authorities
also favour this outsourcing of support by facilitating the creation of larger
partnerships that include different actors such as local governments, uni-
versities, as well as businesses and associations of different types.
14 Accordingly, they need a work authorisation, issued by Regional Directorates for
Companies, Competition, Consumption, Work and Employment (DIRECCTE) and
a medical certificate issued by the OFII.
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Beside a stronger scrutiny of solidarity (as in the case of assessment of
marital bonds of migrant spouses) and outsourcing of solidarity (as in the
socio-economic integration of welcoming of immigrants), another relevant
characteristic of the intervention of the French authorities in the field of
immigration consists of the increasing fight against irregular immigration.
Among the elements of this hard stance against irregular immigration (and
the various dangers that are concomitant with that), a major emphasis
should thus be put on the coercive measures that target those who provide
spontaneous and individually-based aid to immigrants. These coercive
measures have found a legal basis in Article L622-1 of the Code for Entry
and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum (CESEDA) that ban
any action that helps somebody enterFrance irregularly.15 In the eyes of
many pro-migrant actors, these coercive measures —which have often in-
cluded the detention of people who have offered shelter or other kinds of
help to immigrants (later found to be irregular)— have been applied as an
implicit formalisation of a ‘solidarity crime’, the latter being based on a
very vague definition that the law gives to the content of the crime itself.
The vagueness of this definition is so strong that it may allow confusing
human trafficking with genuine concerns and solidarity (Müller 2009 and
2015).
Most crucially, the harsh stand which government and security agencies
have sometimes taken against people committed to the humanitarian aid of
immigrants, including minor actions of help such as speaking up against
undignified conditions, or simply recharging a mobile phone of an immi-
grant in situations of irregularity (Allsopp 2010), has opened room for rel-
ativising the whole concept of solidarity And at the time of writing,a num-
ber of ordinary people, including farmers such as Cédric Herrou, or aca-
demics such as Pierre Mannoni, are going through highly contentious
court trials for the most basic acts of solidarity such as offering water to
migrant children in situations of severe dehydration.16 Far from being a
concept that is universally taken as positive, solidarity has itself become
15 In the words of the article, “Toute personne qui aura, par aide directe ou indirecte,
facilité ou tenté de faciliter l'entrée, la circulation ou le séjour irréguliers, d'un
étranger en France sera punie d'un emprisonnement de cinq ans et d'une amende
de 30 000 euros”.
16 Cf. for example the articles “Farmer on Trial Defends Smuggling Migrants: ‘I Am
a Frenchman” The New York Times, 5 January 2017; and “French Fraternity and
Migrants”, The New York Times, 17 January 2017.
Disability, Unemployment, Immigration in France
295
This content downloaded from 159.149.192.92 on Tue, 12 Mar 2019 07:54:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
contentious, something that can be opposed when it does not favour the
particular interests of policy-makers and main stakeholders.
Conclusive Remarks
We can conclude by attempting to find an underlying thread across the
many recent developments in the field of solidarity, particularly in terms
of the provisions that affect vulnerable groups such as the disabled, the un-
employed, and migrants. As a first (self-indulgent) comment, we can say
that a first underlying thread is that accounting for some similar patterns is
not an easy task not even when looking across similar fields of vulnerabil-
ity. As this chapter has demonstrated, in recent years the legal and policy
production in these fields has been considerable in France, yet reference to
solidarity is rarely explicit, and rarely straightforward in its understanding.
The main finding is indeed that the search for solidarity implies looking
into fields made of complex multi-level structures of policies and institu-
tions. France is usually considered to be a highly unified and centralised
state, scoring very low on the Lijphart’s index of federalism (1999). And
as demonstrated in this chapter, solidarity is no doubt a concept that one
finds in the Republican Constitution (most strongly, in its powerful refer-
ence to fraternité) as well as in the main provisions of national institutions
across the different fields of vulnerability. Yet, especially as a result of the
many new measures of decentralisation that were introduced in the 2000s,
we did find that the shape of fields of solidarity is also influenced by the
intervention of a plurality of actors at the sub-national level.
Designed to correct the institutional imbalance between the national
and the sub-national levels, these measures have had an impact on the way
that solidarity is understood and practiced in France, for example by
changing the access points available for vulnerable groups and by blend-
ing new sets of opportunities and constraints for bottom-up intervention of
French citizens more generally (Cinalli 2004; Cinalli and Giugni 2013). In
particular, by zooming in on this complex multi-level governance of soli-
darity, a further underlying thread that has emerged throughout the pages
of this chapter consists of the growing role of French associations. This is
a relevant result when analysingbottom-up intervention in the public dis-
course of pro-beneficiary organisations in the fields of disability, unem-
ployment, and migration. Their aim is to increase the discursive legitima-
cy of justice and equality for vulnerable people. Besides being a “bastion
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who stands up to defend a large part of the (disabled) people”,17 the main
point is that these associations have taken leading responsibilities in these
current times of economic crisis, welfare retrenchment, and progressive
withdrawal of the state. In particular, associations are playing a double
role. On the one hand, they continue to be close to vulnerable people in a
direct relationship of care and exchange with them, while at the same
time, on the other hand, they fill in the solidarity vacuum left by tradition-
al welfare agents. In the words of an associational leader “respect, equality
and dignity are the most fundamental values. The two main dimensions
are subsidiarity and reciprocity”.18 The sense of purpose and the objective
importance of these associations in the field is further emphasised in times
of austerity policies, when solidarity as direct empathy vis-à-vis vulnera-
ble people and as a welfare enterprise can only continue thanks to their in-
tervention, in spite of the reduction of funds and state support.
Another essential underlying thread that has emerged in the pages of
this chapter is the cross-roads at which solidarity stands today in France,
both in terms of its fundamental understanding and actual practice. Most
crucially, this is a finding that has emerged across all fields of vulnerabili-
ty that we have examined. In very general terms, it can be argued that, fol-
lowing two decades of discussion on the relationship between rights and
responsibilities (Giddens 1998), the project of “third way” is today
stronger than ever before in France. This project, which in political terms
has coincided with the decreasing appeal of traditional parties on both
sides —the right and the left— of the political spectrum, has put much
emphasis on self-initiative, duties, and personal commitment. And even in
the French context of traditional welfare rights, the idea of contractualism
has increasingly become hegemonic, thereby undermining more classic
conceptions of welfare just as much as in other countries that have more
famously taken a neo-liberal turn (Dwyer 2004). The pages of this chapter
have given plenty of space to discussing the extensive policy investment
in measures to tackle vulnerability, socio-economic exclusion, and to
move more vulnerable people from welfare to autonomy. Beside these re-
newed practices of solidarity, however, this chapter has also demonstrated
that a fundamental rethinking of solidarity is taking place. Many times this
fundamental rethinking passes unobserved in the application of measures,
17 Interview No. 5 In the field of disability
18 Interview No. 8 in the field of disability
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but we have identified at least three main scenarios under which this has
emerged in open contradiction with more traditional approaches to solidar-
ity.
A first scenario of potential contradiction between old and new thinking
of solidarity is the case of the ‘commodification of solidarity’, whereby
solidarity has de facto become a tax that actors pay ‘in the name of soli-
darity’, which in fact is not implemented (if not indirectly). There were
many examples throughout this chapter, but the most compelling example
that we have singled out is the de facto monetization of solidarity in the
field of disability into a tax that firms pay as an alternative to the recruit-
ment of disabled people. A second scenario is the ‘inverse contractualisa-
tion of solidarity’, whereby institutional actors have attempted to reverse
the “do ut des” formula (a formula which is itself a neo-liberal approach to
solidarity, since in its traditional letter solidarity should instead be thought
of as free of obligations) in a more stringent “des ut do” formula. In this
case, solidarity becomes an obligation on the side of welfare recipients.
The most compelling example that we have singled out is in the field of
unemployment. It consists of the demand of the Haut-Rhin County Coun-
cil to recipients of the ‘solidarity labour income’ (Revenu de solidarité ac-
tive) to be themselves the agents of solidarity in their work for asso-
ciations, local authorities, retirement homes, and public institutions in gen-
eral. Finally, the third scenario —whereby contradiction between old and
new approaches to solidarity is most strident— refers to the ‘situazionali-
sation of solidarity’, which holds that solidarity is not defined by some
universal traits (and motivations) of solidarity, but rather by an external
viewpoints establishing the distinction between those who do deserve help
(which in this case is rightly named solidarity) and those who do not de-
serve any help (which, if given, would rather be accompliceship, or a ‘sol-
idarity crime’). Under this third scenario, solidarity is really solidarity on-
ly when it has positive externalities on society according to some contin-
gent norms. In this case, the most compelling example that we have sin-
gled out here is in the field of immigration. It consists of the de facto en-
forcement of a ‘solidarity crime’ which French security actors have been
applying against a number of people willing to help needy migrants before
checking on their regular or irregular entrance in the country.
Ultimately, the most provocative conclusion that one can take from this
chapter is that solidaritymay well be the last constraint from which a fully-
fledged neoliberal programme wants to depart. This is no doubt a very am-
bitious goal in countries where solidarity is historically and constitutional-
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ly embedded in the basic understanding that individuals have of their own
citizenship community and of their own political institutions. Due to the
symbiotic ties that solidarity has with Fraternity, it is normal that France is
a crucial stage for the neo-liberal programme to implement its agenda. The
recent economic crisis has had a significant impact on solidarity in France,
both in terms of the more visible and formal dynamics of top-down wel-
fare policies, and of the policies aiming to include the disabled, the unem-
ployed, and migrants. This is true to such an extent that it could be said
that the impact of the crisis is what most strongly unites the three fields of
vulnerability in this chapter. Yet the long-term analysis of this chapter —
mostly focusing on policy developments throughout the 2000s and the
2010s — allows for arguing that the economic crisis has not in fact led to
outstanding policy changes. Indeed, changes often follow a rhythm that is
in agreement with previous ‘reforms’ according to longer-term trends,
sometimes having begun well into the pre-crisis period. In the voice of
some commentators, the crisis has thus been a tool to justify restrictive re-
forms that were already considered “necessary” before the crisis. The
monetisation of solidarity, its reversal on the shoulders of solidarity recipi-
ents in terms of obligations, as well as the idea that solidarity can be good
hic et nunc but not necessarily everywhere and at any time, are perhaps
crucial points that help us to identify the (front)line whereby neo-liberal
reforms stand at the present time.
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